obsidian
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables the agent to read and process external Markdown notes from an Obsidian vault, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions hidden in notes could be executed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: Content is ingested through
obsidian readcommands, shellcatoperations on vault files, andgrepsearch functionality. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are implemented when processing note content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including file system modification (create, append, move, delete), shell command execution, and arbitrary JavaScript execution via
obsidian eval. - Sanitization: The skill does not appear to sanitize or validate content retrieved from external files before processing it.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the
obsidian evalcommand incli-reference.mdandchangelog.md, which allows for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the Obsidian application context. Although listed as a developer command, it represents a potential vector for dynamic code execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several bash helper functions provided in
reference.md(such asobs-sessionandobs-task) use shell variables within unquoted heredocs or command arguments. This could lead to command injection if an agent or user provides unsanitized input to these helpers. - [PERSISTENCE]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdandreference.mdinstructs the user to modify their shell configuration files (.zshrcor.bashrc) to add environment variables and helper functions. While these are standard configuration practices for this integration, modifying startup scripts is a common technique for establishing persistence.
Audit Metadata