openclaw
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation in
references/deployment.mdrecommends an installation method that downloads and executes a remote script directly:curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
references/advanced-tools.mdfile describes anexectool designed to allow the agent to run arbitrary shell commands within the configured environment. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
references/config-schema.mdreveals that sensitive authentication data, including gateway tokens and messaging bot tokens (Telegram/WhatsApp), are stored in plaintext within theopenclaw.jsonconfiguration file. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The unified management script
scripts/openclaw.shand the CLI documented inreferences/cli-full.mdprovide extensive control over the system, including daemon service management, plugin installation, and system-wide configuration resets. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a high surface area for indirect prompt injection due to its integration with untrusted external data sources.
- Ingestion points: Data entering from messaging channels (WhatsApp, Telegram, Discord) as seen in
references/cli-full.md, and web content retrieved via the managed Playwright browser. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to disregard instructions embedded in external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides capabilities for arbitrary command execution (
exectool), background service control, and file system access. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for data processed from messaging nodes or browser snapshots.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata