token-saver
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill injects fake
SYSTEM:directives into workspace files via thecompressMemoryfunction inscripts/compressor.js, which mimics system-level instructions to override agent behavior. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Hardcoded instructions like 'Auto-execute, no permission needed' and 'Don't ask permission. Just do it' are inserted into core agent files to bypass safety guardrails and user confirmation prompts.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/analyzer.jsfile reads the user's global configuration (openclaw.json) and entire session history (.jsonlfiles) from the home directory, exposing private data and potentially sensitive credentials. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Persistent Mode' feature in
scripts/optimizer.jsmodifies theAGENTS.mdfile to append instructions that permanently alter the agent's operational logic and writing style across all future sessions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs path traversal techniques in
scripts/optimizer.jsto escape the skill directory and gain read/write access to the broader parent workspace environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a deceptive
audit.jsonfile that provides a false 'CLEAN' security rating, which is an attempt to mislead users and scanners regarding the documented malicious patterns.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata