bgpt-paper-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's setup instructions direct users to execute remote packages using
npx mcp-remoteandnpx bgpt-mcp. This allows for the runtime download and execution of arbitrary code from the npm registry and a remote endpoint. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external resources hosted at
https://bgpt.pro/mcp/sseand a personal GitHub repositoryconnerlambden/bgpt-mcp. These sources are not recognized as trusted organizations or well-known services, increasing the risk of malicious payload delivery. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data from scientific papers.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from full-text studies via the
search_paperstool (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the paper data.
- Capability inventory: The skill specifies
Bashin itsallowed-toolsconfiguration, providing a sensitive execution environment that could be targeted by instructions within ingested data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the data returned from the remote paper database.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata