bgpt-paper-search

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's setup instructions direct users to execute remote packages using npx mcp-remote and npx bgpt-mcp. This allows for the runtime download and execution of arbitrary code from the npm registry and a remote endpoint.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external resources hosted at https://bgpt.pro/mcp/sse and a personal GitHub repository connerlambden/bgpt-mcp. These sources are not recognized as trusted organizations or well-known services, increasing the risk of malicious payload delivery.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data from scientific papers.
  • Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from full-text studies via the search_papers tool (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the paper data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill specifies Bash in its allowed-tools configuration, providing a sensitive execution environment that could be targeted by instructions within ingested data.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the data returned from the remote paper database.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 13, 2026, 10:20 AM