Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF files, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection. \n
- Ingestion points:
scripts/extract_form_structure.py,scripts/extract_form_field_info.py, andscripts/convert_pdf_to_images.pyread data directly from external PDF files. \n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the scripts or the skill's guidelines. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files and execute command-line tools like
qpdfandpdftotext. \n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of text sanitization or filtering before the extracted data is passed to the agent context. \n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements runtime monkeypatching by overridingpypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedto modify the library's handling of inherited field attributes. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation and scripts involve the execution of external binary tools includingqpdf,pdftotext,pdftk, and ImageMagick for PDF and image manipulation.
Audit Metadata