pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF files, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection. \n
  • Ingestion points: scripts/extract_form_structure.py, scripts/extract_form_field_info.py, and scripts/convert_pdf_to_images.py read data directly from external PDF files. \n
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the scripts or the skill's guidelines. \n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files and execute command-line tools like qpdf and pdftotext. \n
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of text sanitization or filtering before the extracted data is passed to the agent context. \n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py implements runtime monkeypatching by overriding pypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inherited to modify the library's handling of inherited field attributes. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation and scripts involve the execution of external binary tools including qpdf, pdftotext, pdftk, and ImageMagick for PDF and image manipulation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 13, 2026, 10:21 AM