token-efficiency
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
evals/measure.pyscript utilizessubprocess.runto execute the mainclaudeCLI with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag, which is specifically designed to bypass user security prompts and permissions. Furthermore,hooks/install.pymodifies system settings to register and execute local Python scripts as persistent hooks.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs extensive reading of sensitive internal files, including~/.claude.jsonand conversation transcripts located within~/.claude/projects/. These transcripts expose the full history of user interactions and agent activities to the skill's logic.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The scriptshooks/install.pyandhooks/context_budget.pydirectly read and modify the tool's primary configuration files (settings.jsonand~/.claude.json). These files are critical security boundaries that manage the agent's behavior and environment access.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a mechanism for indirect prompt injection by using hooks (hooks/efficiency_core.pyandhooks/trajectory_guard.py) that ingest untrusted data from user prompts and tool responses to dynamically inject instructions into the agent's context. Evidence: The hooks processuser_inputandtool_responseand usehookSpecificOutputto influence the prompt without explicit sanitization or boundary delimiters.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata