claude-api
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file
templates/tool-use-advanced.tsincludes acalculatorTooldefinition that uses theeval()function to process mathematical expressions. While the code includes a comment warning about the dangers ofeval(), implementing this pattern in an AI-agent workflow allows for potential arbitrary JavaScript execution if the model is manipulated by untrusted input. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides patterns for processing untrusted external data (such as user messages and documents) that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via the
messagesarray intemplates/basic-chat.ts, file reads intemplates/nodejs-example.ts, and image metadata intemplates/vision-image.ts. - Boundary markers: The provided templates do not demonstrate the use of recommended delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill describes capabilities including network operations (via Claude API), filesystem writes in
templates/nodejs-example.ts, and dynamic code execution intemplates/tool-use-advanced.ts. - Sanitization: Although
SKILL.mdsuggests sanitizing tool results to prevent JSON parsing failures (handling U+2028/U+2029), there is no evidence of sanitization intended to mitigate prompt injection attacks.
Audit Metadata