claude-api

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file templates/tool-use-advanced.ts includes a calculatorTool definition that uses the eval() function to process mathematical expressions. While the code includes a comment warning about the dangers of eval(), implementing this pattern in an AI-agent workflow allows for potential arbitrary JavaScript execution if the model is manipulated by untrusted input.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides patterns for processing untrusted external data (such as user messages and documents) that could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via the messages array in templates/basic-chat.ts, file reads in templates/nodejs-example.ts, and image metadata in templates/vision-image.ts.
  • Boundary markers: The provided templates do not demonstrate the use of recommended delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill describes capabilities including network operations (via Claude API), filesystem writes in templates/nodejs-example.ts, and dynamic code execution in templates/tool-use-advanced.ts.
  • Sanitization: Although SKILL.md suggests sanitizing tool results to prevent JSON parsing failures (handling U+2028/U+2029), there is no evidence of sanitization intended to mitigate prompt injection attacks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 06:55 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — claude-api