image-gen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
image-prompteragent is configured with theWebFetchtool, allowing it to ingest content from external websites to inform the prompt generation process. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where an attacker could place malicious instructions on a website that the agent might fetch to influence its behavior or output. - Ingestion points: The agent uses the
WebFetchtool to gather requirements and context as described inagents/image-prompter.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or explicit directives for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The skill documentation includes examples for local file system operations (
fs.writeFileSync), API interaction with Gemini models, and the use of image processing CLI tools such asmagickandrembg. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitizing or filtering external content fetched via
WebFetchbefore it is processed by the agent. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation and integration guides recommend the installation of several third-party libraries and CLI utilities for image generation and post-processing.
- Evidence:
references/integration.mdandSKILL.mdreferencepnpm add @google/genai,pip install rembg, and@imgly/background-removal-node. - Note: These resources originate from well-known services and trusted organizations, and their use is consistent with the skill's stated purpose of image generation and manipulation.
Audit Metadata