expo-data-fetching

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the use of npx --yes submit-expo-feedback@latest, which downloads and executes code from an unverified package on the public NPM registry at runtime without user confirmation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The npx feedback command allows for direct shell execution in the user's terminal environment.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The feedback mechanism transmits user-provided text to an external package, creating a potential vector for exfiltrating environment variables or source code.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external packages. While it includes well-known libraries like @tanstack/react-query and expo-router, it also involves the unverified submit-expo-feedback package.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill promotes patterns for fetching data from external APIs without providing guidance on how to safely process that data when it enters the agent's context.
  • Ingestion points: Data fetching examples in SKILL.md and references/expo-router-loaders.md (loader functions).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; no instructions are provided to use delimiters or warnings for external data.
  • Capability inventory: SKILL.md and references/expo-router-loaders.md utilize network requests (fetch) and sensitive storage (expo-secure-store).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the instructions do not cover sanitizing or escaping content before it is processed by the AI.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 09:27 PM