deploy-skills-in-antigravity
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the installation and execution of code from external repositories via the
npx skills addcommand. This pattern allows the agent to fetch and integrate executable skills from user-provided or context-derived URLs (e.g.,https://github.com/username/repo-name). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains platform-specific scripts (Bash and PowerShell) for relocating files between
~/.agents/skills/and~/.gemini/config/skills/. - Evidence (Linux/macOS):
mkdir -p "$HOME/.gemini/config/skills/" && [ -d "$HOME/.agents/skills" ] && for d in "$HOME/.agents/skills"/*/; do [ -d "$d" ] && rm -rf "$HOME/.gemini/config/skills/$(basename "$d")" && mv "$d" "$HOME/.gemini/config/skills/"; done - Evidence (Windows): Uses
Remove-Item -Recurse -ForceandMove-Item -Forceto manage directories. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers downloads from external sources, specifically GitHub repositories, to add or update agent capabilities.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes
SKILL.mdfiles from untrusted external repositories. - Ingestion points: The agent reads the first 10 lines of
SKILL.mdfrom downloaded repositories in Step 5 (Verification Loop). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content within the ingested files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
run_command), package installation (npx), and file write capabilities (skills.json). - Sanitization: Absent; there is no evidence of validation or filtering for the content read from external skill files.
Audit Metadata