maintaining-core-documentation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCECREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to download and install an external skill from a non-trusted third-party repository using automated flags.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, the agent is directed to install thetechnical-writerskill using the commandnpx skills add https://github.com/shubhamsaboo/awesome-llm-apps --skill technical-writer -g -y. The use of the-yflag bypasses confirmation prompts for installing code from an untrusted source. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides templates and samples that instruct the modification of the user's shell profile to maintain access or environment hooks.
- Evidence: The file
references/samples/README.mdprovides instructions to append code to the shell profile:echo "eval \"\$(direnv hook bash)\"" >> ~/.bashrc. This establishes a persistent hook that executes code whenever a new shell session is started. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill is designed to read and verify the contents of sensitive configuration files that typically contain secrets and credentials.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to "Verify the codebase, configuration settings (e.g. config.py, Makefile, *.tfvars, pyproject.toml), environment variable names... before updating documentation." Files such as.tfvarsand.env(mentioned in samples) are classified as sensitive file paths that may expose credentials. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions involve executing powerful system commands for identity and access management and service configuration.
- Evidence: The documentation templates in
references/samples/README.mdincludegcloudcommands to modify IAM policy bindings (gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding) and enable cloud services, which could be misused to escalate privileges if not carefully reviewed by a user. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface by ingesting untrusted data from the codebase it is documenting without clear boundary markers or sanitization.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads project files including
conductor/tech-stack.md,config.py,Makefile,*.tfvars,pyproject.toml, and.envfiles to synchronize documentation. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded commands within these project files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files across the repository and execute shell commands via
npxandgcloud. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the configuration files before it is processed or used in documentation generation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata