frontegg-to-descope

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
  • Ingestion points: Codebase analysis via grep patterns in 'references/frontegg-detection-patterns.md' and user input via the AskUserQuestion tool.
  • Boundary markers: The skill requires human review of the generated 'MIGRATION-PLAN.md' and 'MIGRATION-STATE.md' before any code changes or project modifications are executed.
  • Capability inventory: Capabilities include file system read/write, shell command execution for analysis, and network operations through the Descope MCP server.
  • Sanitization: Codebase content used for analysis is not explicitly sanitized before interpolation into migration documents.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes 'grep' and 'find' commands to perform deep analysis of the user's codebase. These commands are configured to search for specific authentication patterns, environment variables, and dependency manifests.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the migration process by recommending the installation of official Descope SDKs and interacting with vendor-hosted services, including the Descope MCP Server and Frontegg's regional management gateways.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The migration process requires access to sensitive environment secrets (e.g., 'FRONTEGG_API_KEY', 'DESCOPE_MANAGEMENT_KEY'). The skill provides explicit guidance on the secure management of these keys, including warnings against client-side exposure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 12, 2026, 08:26 PM