composio

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves data from external sources, including Composio API responses (e.g., via GET /connected_accounts) and task metadata, which is then used as input for subsequent CLI commands and tool executions. This creates a surface where malformed or malicious data from connected third-party accounts could influence the agent's actions.
  • Ingestion points: Data returned by resolve-user (SKILL.md) and GET /connected_accounts (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to disregard commands potentially embedded within the content of retrieved emails, docs, or account metadata.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute a wide range of Composio REST API methods via the CLI and modify platform-level user profiles using the manage-user capability.
  • Sanitization: No explicit logic is provided to validate or escape external IDs or API results before they are interpolated into new command structures.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary interface is a CLI wrapper (agent-swarm x composio). The agent is instructed to construct and execute shell-level commands with dynamic arguments derived from the conversation and external API calls.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documents the use of the manage-user utility to update user identities and map them to external services. This is a sensitive administrative function that allows the agent to modify user account configurations, which could lead to unauthorized access or data corruption if mismanaged.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 02:13 AM