composio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves data from external sources, including Composio API responses (e.g., via
GET /connected_accounts) and task metadata, which is then used as input for subsequent CLI commands and tool executions. This creates a surface where malformed or malicious data from connected third-party accounts could influence the agent's actions. - Ingestion points: Data returned by
resolve-user(SKILL.md) andGET /connected_accounts(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to disregard commands potentially embedded within the content of retrieved emails, docs, or account metadata.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute a wide range of Composio REST API methods via the CLI and modify platform-level user profiles using the
manage-usercapability. - Sanitization: No explicit logic is provided to validate or escape external IDs or API results before they are interpolated into new command structures.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary interface is a CLI wrapper (
agent-swarm x composio). The agent is instructed to construct and execute shell-level commands with dynamic arguments derived from the conversation and external API calls. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documents the use of the
manage-userutility to update user identities and map them to external services. This is a sensitive administrative function that allows the agent to modify user account configurations, which could lead to unauthorized access or data corruption if mismanaged.
Audit Metadata