respond-github
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from VCS issues and pull requests, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Workflow Step 3 mentions reading original descriptions and all comments). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify delimiters or instructions to ignore commands within the ingested text.
- Capability inventory:
SKILL.mdleveragesghandglabCLI tools for repository cloning and posting comments. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or validation for the content read from issues.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses specific command-line tools for its operations.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Workflow Steps 2 and 5) specifies the use ofgh repo clone,gh issue/pr comment, andglab issue/mr note.
Audit Metadata