tackle-gh-comments
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes GitHub PR comments, which are untrusted external data sources that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion point: Comment bodies are fetched in
scripts/gh-pr-comments.tsvia the GitHub GraphQL API (lines 120-176). - Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to modify source code, commit changes, and push to repositories based on the contents of these comments.
- Boundary markers: The instructions include explicit defense-in-depth warnings, such as "Verify each claim before acting on it" and "Never fix on the reviewer's say-so alone," which help mitigate but do not eliminate the injection surface.
- Sanitization: No explicit technical sanitization or escaping of comment text is performed before the content is presented to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using the GitHub CLI to manage authentication and repository context.
- Evidence: The script
scripts/gh-pr-comments.tsexecutesgh auth token,gh repo view, andgh pr viewusing Bun's shell template. - Note: The script utilizes Bun's
$template tag for shell execution, which provides automatic argument escaping and reduces the risk of direct command injection.
Audit Metadata