limitr-py

Warn

Audited by Snyk on Nov 21, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUM
Full Analysis

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (low risk: 0.10). The required workflow is the Limitr SDK's gating, metering, and persistence API, which ingests no outsider text. The only outsider-authored path is the optional Limitr Network, where the agent buys third-party routes with network.connect and their results return to Claude as tool results, so it is a low-risk marketplace-style source that the agent must actively select.

MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

  • Direct money access detected (medium risk: 0.30). The skill is mainly a usage-metering and entitlement library for Python apps. Most of it (allow/check gating, reserve/settle for LLM calls, feature flags, spend caps) is service-cost and usage tracking, or implementation guidance for software the agent builds, so it is excluded. Some documented routes do touch money. apply_customer_topup on Limitr Cloud asks Cloud to buy the topup, and Cloud charges first, then the grant arrives (lines 225-228). That is a direct charge/purchase operation. ensure_customer_plan_quantity charges the plan's subscription entitlement (lines 226-227). The Limitr Network module lets the agent buy routes with network.connect(url, plan, spend, expires) and sell them (lines 289-294). The event handler example calls charge() on meter-overage (lines 233-235), but that is app-implementation guidance for a billing handler, not an operational route offered by the skill.

For the Cloud topup purchase, the control is a Cloud token (LIMITR_TOKEN). Limitr.cloud returns None if Cloud refuses the token (line 268). Client tokens are scoped to a customer, can't create or change customers, and expire (lines 279-285). Cloud validates the token on the service side, so this is service API credential authentication gating the charge route. That is a qualifying independent control, which puts this route at medium. The Network buy route is described only through a secret_key, with details deferred to another skill, so it is unspecified. The Network buy route is also ambiguous as a payment instruction, since spend is a budget for a service, and the evidence is not strong enough to promote it to high. Overall: direct operations with service-enforced credential authentication, so medium.


MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (low risk: 0.10). The skill exposes runtime operations that change the engine's live policy (set_plan, delete_plan, set_capabilities, doc_call), which is operational change, but no supplied text establishes explicit irreversible loss of operational state, so the irreversible-loss gate fails and the tier is capped at low.

Issues (3)

W011
MEDIUM

Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

W009
MEDIUM

Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Nov 21, 2026, 02:37 AM
Issues
3