pr-feedback
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from GitHub PR comments and review threads which could potentially contain malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior during the feedback loop.\n
- Ingestion points: External review data is ingested in
SKILL.md(Step 2) viagh api graphqlandgh pr viewcalls.\n - Boundary markers: The skill enforces a strong security boundary through a mandatory human approval gate; Rule 1 and Step 4 require the user to approve all planned fixes and replies before any remote operations are executed.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to modify the local filesystem (Step 5), execute shell commands via
gitandgh(Steps 1, 6, 7), and update remote repositories by invoking the/commit-push-prskill.\n - Sanitization: No automated sanitization of fetched comment bodies is performed, relying instead on the user's manual review of the disposition list.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses standard command-line tools to interact with the repository and the GitHub platform.\n
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddocuments the use ofgitfor branch management andgh(GitHub CLI) for querying and interacting with the GitHub API.
Audit Metadata