tdd-loop

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a repeated 'Zero attribution' directive (present in almost every file, including SKILL.md and all reference files) that instructs the agent to never include co-author, AI, or tool attribution in any output. This overrides the agent's default behavior of transparency regarding its AI nature.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The 'Zero attribution' rule includes a directive to propagate itself: 'Include this rule in any Markdown or settings file this workflow creates or updates.' This is a deceptive practice intended to hide the AI-generated origin of work products across the project lifecycle.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted external data in the form of bug reports, tickets, and user requests to generate implementation code and test suites.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided requests, bug reports, and tickets described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific delimiters or warnings provided to the agent to treat this external content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files (code, tests, docs) and execute shell commands for testing (pnpm, pytest, go test, etc.) as documented in references/test-commands.md.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any sanitization or escaping for the content ingested from tickets.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a detailed catalog of shell commands for executing tests across multiple ecosystems (Node.js, PHP, Python, Go) in references/test-commands.md. While these are standard development tools, the agent is instructed to execute these commands locally based on its own seam discovery process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 17, 2026, 08:36 PM