code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct and execute shell commands (
git diff,git log,git rev-parse) using a user-provided string ('fixed-point'). While the skill includes a validation step usinggit rev-parsebefore execution, the instruction to 'pass it directly' without additional sanitization or shell-escaping logic creates a potential surface for command injection if the agent's tool execution environment does not automatically handle argument quoting. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from the local repository and interpolates it into the instructions for its sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
git diffoutput, commit messages, and external documentation/specification files located in the repository (e.g.,docs/,specs/, or.scratch/). - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdfor launching sub-agents do not specify the use of clear delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the diffs or commit messages. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
gitCLI tools and the ability to read and aggregate data from multiple files across the filesystem. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or filtering of the external content (diff hunks or commit titles) before it is passed to the sub-agent prompts.
Audit Metadata