ui-ux-auditor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the
browser_subagent(when visiting user-provided URLs) andview_file(when analyzing user-provided videos or images) as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings for the content being audited, which could allow malicious instructions embedded in a target website or image to influence the agent.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to run shell commands (
run_command), browse the web (browser_subagent), and read local files (view_file). - Sanitization: There is no explicit requirement for the agent to sanitize or validate the content of the audited application before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to manage user-provided assets.
- Evidence: The instruction in
SKILL.mdstates:Use run_command to unzip (unzip <file> -d <dir>). - Context: This is a routine operational requirement for handling application screenshots provided in a compressed format.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external websites to gather audit evidence.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to usebrowser_subagentto navigate to live web URLs or YouTube links provided by the user. - Context: This behavior is core to the skill's primary purpose of auditing live applications, and access is managed through the browser subagent.
Audit Metadata