ui-ux-auditor

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the browser_subagent (when visiting user-provided URLs) and view_file (when analyzing user-provided videos or images) as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings for the content being audited, which could allow malicious instructions embedded in a target website or image to influence the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to run shell commands (run_command), browse the web (browser_subagent), and read local files (view_file).
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit requirement for the agent to sanitize or validate the content of the audited application before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to manage user-provided assets.
  • Evidence: The instruction in SKILL.md states: Use run_command to unzip (unzip <file> -d <dir>).
  • Context: This is a routine operational requirement for handling application screenshots provided in a compressed format.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external websites to gather audit evidence.
  • Evidence: Instructions in SKILL.md direct the agent to use browser_subagent to navigate to live web URLs or YouTube links provided by the user.
  • Context: This behavior is core to the skill's primary purpose of auditing live applications, and access is managed through the browser subagent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 6, 2026, 01:30 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ui-ux-auditor