create-plugin
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides documentation and templates for the
experimental.chat.system.transformhook, which allows created plugins to programmatically modify the agent's system prompt. - Ingestion points: Data from the chat environment (untrusted input) enters the plugin context via the hook's input parameters in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The provided documentation and code examples do not specify or encourage the use of boundary markers or delimiters to isolate injected content from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill notes that plugins have access to high-privilege APIs including
child_process,node:fs/promises, andfetch(), which amplifies the risk if the system prompt is manipulated. - Sanitization: There is no mention or implementation of sanitization, escaping, or validation for the content being pushed into the system prompt array.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to scaffold and write executable TypeScript code to the local filesystem (
.opencode/plugins/) which is then dynamically loaded and executed by the OpenCode runtime. - The documentation explicitly mentions that these generated plugins can utilize
child_processandfs, creating a significant surface for command execution and file system interaction.
Audit Metadata