embed-aihero-radioactive
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an orchestrator that ingests untrusted data from multiple sources which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes user-supplied
featureDescriptionandtechStackinputs, along with existing repository files (e.g.,AGENTS.md,skills/<projectSlug>/SKILL.md) and codebase files mapped during the orientation phase. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when interpolating these external inputs into its planning phases.
- Capability inventory: The workflow has high-impact capabilities including shell command execution (
npm,bun,pytest,rspec) and persistent file system write access for scaffolding new skills and tasks. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the feature descriptions or existing project documentation before they are used to generate the task specification in Phase 7.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute various local shell commands as part of the development lifecycle.
- Evidence: Phase 10 and Phase 12 explicitly call for running test runners and build tools, specifically mentioning
npm run test,rspec-rails,vitest,pytest, andbun run build. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves the runtime generation and registration of executable code structures.
- Evidence: Phase 8 ('BLUEPRINT CONTRACT') scaffolds a new executable workflow contract at a computed path (
skills/<projectSlug>/workflows/<feature-slug>/SKILL.md) and wires it into the project's routing matrix for future execution.
Audit Metadata