cksol
Audited by Snyk on Nov 19, 2026
MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).
- Direct money access detected (medium risk: 0.30). Operational financial scope: the skill documents and runs direct SOL transfers. Its "Verify It Works" section gives mainnet commands that approve and burn ckSOL, then send 0.01 SOL to an external Solana address via
withdraw_sol(lines 280-283). The withdrawal sends SOL, so it is a direct operation. The deposit flow (deposit_sol, lines 40-41, 271-273) converts SOL to ckSOL and is also an operational financial instruction. The skill is not merely a build-time example: it covers operating the financial task, so the development exclusion does not apply.
Control: the direct withdrawal route is gated by the ledger and minter at the service layer. withdraw_sol burns from the caller's account (line 51), and the ICRC-2 allowance authorizes the minter to spend only from the caller's account (lines 50, 17). Access therefore depends on the caller's authenticated IC principal, which the service enforces, not on agent-followed instructions. The skill does not document an explicit minter-side anonymous rejection for withdrawals. The anonymous-caller check appears only in the app backend examples (lines 181-185, 253), which are developer guidance. Because the control is inferred from the principal-bound burn rather than an explicit documented check, this is a close call. The recall-first instruction favors flagging it, so the answer is medium on the basis of the service-enforced principal and allowance, with the gap noted.
Issues (1)
Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).