deploy-to-cloud-engine
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute the
icpCLI tool with various subcommands includingidentity link,deploy, andcanister settings. These operations interact with the local filesystem and the network. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted inputs from the user, specifically the
subnet-idandconsole-origin, which are then interpolated into shell commands. - Ingestion points: User-provided strings for engine configuration in
SKILL.md(Step 1 and Step 3). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to sanitize or validate these inputs before including them in shell command strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs subprocess execution (
icpcommands), file reads (icp.yaml,package.json), and network requests (via the CLI). - Sanitization: Absent. The agent is not instructed to escape shell characters or validate the format of the provided IDs or URLs.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
metadataconfiguration examples foricp.yamlutilize shell command substitution$(...)(e.g.,$(git rev-parse HEAD),$(node -p ...)). The skill explicitly notes that these values are interpolated into shell commands at build time, creating a vector for executing arbitrary code defined within the project's configuration files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external domains for documentation (
cli.internetcomputer.org) and default service endpoints (opencloud.org). These references are consistent with the infrastructure of the author (dfinity).
Audit Metadata