icp-cli

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Nov 20, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

  • Potential prompt injection detected (medium risk: 0.30). The skill is a legitimate icp-cli guide, but it instructs the agent to keep an experimental bundling command out of the user's view and not suggest it unless asked, which is a mild concealment of a capability, so under recall-first I classify it as medium rather than no.

MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

  • Direct money access detected (high risk: 0.70). The skill is mainly a CLI guide for building and deploying IC canisters, which is development tooling. Deploy costs are service costs and are excluded. However, it also documents operational funding steps for a real mainnet identity. icp cycles mint --cycles <gap> -n ic converts ICP into cycles, a direct conversion of financial assets. icp cycles buy --cycles <gap> -n ic --identity "$ID" --no-open --yes --json creates a card-purchase order for cycles through CyclePay.

These are direct operations, since they are purchases or conversions. The skill tells the agent to disclose the gap and offer both options to the human, and says the human pays on the link. That is agent-followed instruction and human hand-off, not documented service-enforced authentication for the route. For cycles mint, the only gate is the local identity key, which is local signing and does not count as independent access control. For cycles buy, the human pays on the link, which is an external payment step. But the skill does not describe the CyclePay gateway authenticating or authorizing the order. The --yes flag also skips confirmations. So no qualifying control is established for these direct routes, and the tier is high.


MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.70). The skill documents operational changes such as icp deploy -e ic to shared mainnet, icp network start/stop, identity deletion and settings updates. The only explicit irreversible-loss text is icp deploy --mode reinstall ("Clear all state (dangerous)") and the note that reinstall wipes stored state, which is explicit loss of canister state. Canisters on the ic network are remotely managed, so they are presumed shared, and the same deploy operation covers both the reinstall mode and the mainnet target.

Issues (3)

E004
CRITICAL

Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

W009
MEDIUM

Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Nov 20, 2026, 04:15 PM
Issues
3