agent-ready-rails
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the repository being audited, creating a surface where malicious instructions in the target codebase could influence the agent during scoring or remediation.
- Ingestion points: The
assets/collect_evidence.pyscript reads configuration files, documentation, and source code (e.g.,package.json,.github/workflows/,CLAUDE.md, and.claude/settings.json) from the target repository. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded prompts are provided to the agent when it analyzes the collected evidence.
- Capability inventory: The skill instructions allow the agent to execute the collector script via shell and to write new files (e.g., entrypoints or CI configurations) to the target repository when applying fixes.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization of external repository content before the agent processes it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution to perform its audit functions and run its internal test suite.
- The
SKILL.mdinstructions require the agent to run theassets/collect_evidence.pyscript usingpython3to gather repository evidence. - The
eval/run_eval.pyandassets/test_collect_evidence.pyfiles usesubprocess.run()to execute the collector script for evaluation and testing purposes.
Audit Metadata