agent-ready-rails

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the repository being audited, creating a surface where malicious instructions in the target codebase could influence the agent during scoring or remediation.
  • Ingestion points: The assets/collect_evidence.py script reads configuration files, documentation, and source code (e.g., package.json, .github/workflows/, CLAUDE.md, and .claude/settings.json) from the target repository.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded prompts are provided to the agent when it analyzes the collected evidence.
  • Capability inventory: The skill instructions allow the agent to execute the collector script via shell and to write new files (e.g., entrypoints or CI configurations) to the target repository when applying fixes.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization of external repository content before the agent processes it.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution to perform its audit functions and run its internal test suite.
  • The SKILL.md instructions require the agent to run the assets/collect_evidence.py script using python3 to gather repository evidence.
  • The eval/run_eval.py and assets/test_collect_evidence.py files use subprocess.run() to execute the collector script for evaluation and testing purposes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 10:43 AM