knowledge-gardener
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes metadata from
explainer.mdfiles within knowledge bundles to drive its maintenance workflow. This creates a surface where malicious content in those files could influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points:
explainer.mdfiles in bundles targeted by thesweepcommand. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore instructions embedded in the source data.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes
gitcommands throughsubprocess.runand provides command templates for the agent to perform logs and diffs. - Sanitization: The tool lacks validation for the
locatorpaths and other metadata extracted from bundle files before they are used in shell commands. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operation depends on executing external commands.
- Evidence:
assets/garden.pyusessubprocess.runto callgit rev-parse,git status, andgit diff. Thereferences/refresh-playbook.mddirects the agent to execute variousgitcommands using parameters parsed from the bundle files.
Audit Metadata