world-model-ledger
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill analyzes agent transcripts to update its persistent world model, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: The
harvest.pyscript andhooks/stop.shprocess JSONL transcript files to extract behavioral markers.\n - Boundary markers: The implementation includes significant protections; it ignores
tool_resultcontent to prevent injection via file content or command output, and requires markers to be placed at the start of a line.\n - Capability inventory: The skill maintains a persistent SQLite database (
model.db) and injects summarized context into agent sessions.\n - Sanitization: The harvester uses role-based filtering, accepting authoritative oracle evidence (such as
WM-VALIDATED) only from theuserrole, which prevents the agent from being influenced by untrusted data it might quote in its own responses.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The evaluation scripteval/grade.pyusessubprocess.runto execute Python code generated by the agent within a testing context to verify the functional correctness of the agent's changes.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The installation scriptscripts/install.shregisters lifecycle hooks in the agent'ssettings.jsonfile, which is the required mechanism for enabling persistent codebase memory and turn-by-turn observation.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Theeval/run_eval.pyscript usesimportlib.utilfor dynamic module loading to facilitate automated testing and validation of the skill's components.
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