agent-mail
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installer script (
scripts/install.sh) and README documentation recommend piping remote shell scripts directly intobashorshfrom a non-trusted repository (e.g.,https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/mcp_agent_mail/main/scripts/install.sh). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of
subprocess.runandsubprocess.check_outputacross core logic (src/mcp_agent_mail/guard.py,src/mcp_agent_mail/storage.py) and various scripts to interact with thegitCLI and other system commands. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
send_messagetool can be configured to allow absolute filesystem paths in attachments (controlled by theALLOW_ABSOLUTE_ATTACHMENT_PATHSsetting). When enabled, this creates a filesystem read primitive allowing agents to potentially exfiltrate any file accessible to the server process. - [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: Integration scripts such as
scripts/integrate_claude_code.shmodify user shell profiles (.bashrc,.zshrc) to add aliases and environment variables. The skill also installs persistent Git hooks (pre-commit,pre-push) into repositories to enforce coordination rules. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
scripts/install.shscript utilizessudoto install system-level dependencies likejqthrough various package managers. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: A hardcoded authentication token is present in the
.claude/settings.jsonfile (AGENT_MAIL_TOKEN='dc5029ac32a9f350508a565af683205cf99f25c896b07c07bc53a9517877ce8c'). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface as it ingests untrusted message data from agents via
fetch_inboxand provides high-privilege tools such asinstall_precommit_guardandfile_reservation_pathswhich can influence the behavior of other agents. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Multiple scripts download and execute content from external domains including
github.comandastral.shfor dependency installation and configuration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
AGENTS.mdfile contains strong behavioral overrides (e.g., 'RULE NUMBER 1 (NEVER EVER EVER FORGET THIS RULE!!!): YOU ARE NEVER ALLOWED TO DELETE A FILE...') that attempt to fundamentally alter standard AI agent safety and operational protocols.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/mcp_agent_mail/main/scripts/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata