workplace
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface. It dynamically builds system prompts for sub-agents using data from external sources. \n
- Ingestion points: Project file scanning during initialization and monitoring of the
chat.mdcommunication log. \n - Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined for project data;
chat.mdrelies on regex patterns which do not prevent malicious instruction execution. \n - Capability inventory: The skill can spawn new agent sessions with custom prompts, execute local bash scripts, and write to the filesystem. \n
- Sanitization: No evidence of content escaping or validation before interpolation into agent prompts. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses several bash scripts to manage its local registry at
~/.openclaw/, scan for.gitrepositories, and build the communication server. These operations involve direct interaction with the host filesystem. \n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Thescripts/build.shfile contains a help message referencing thecurl | shpattern for installing the Rust toolchain fromhttps://sh.rustup.rs. While Rust is a well-known technology, this pattern represents a high-risk remote code execution vector. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: During the build phase, the skill uses the standard Rust package manager (cargo) to download dependencies from the official crates.io registry.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://sh.rustup.rs - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata