dido-code-style
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is inherently designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data from an external repository, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and processes the target repository's source code,
CLAUDE.md, documentation,MEMORY.md, andgit loghistory (documented inSKILL.mdandanalisi.md). - Boundary markers: The orchestration prompts in
repo-audit.jsdo not include explicit delimiters or instructions for sub-agents to ignore potentially malicious content within the analyzed files. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (for tests/builds/audits), file system read access, and the ability to spawn additional sub-agents via the
agent()function. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering before repository data is passed to the AI agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
repo-audit.jsscript identifies and executes shell commands defined within the analyzed project's metadata (e.g.,package.json,Makefile). While the script contains instructions to avoid destructive commands and use temporary environments, this remains a high-capability risk if the agent is influenced by malicious project-defined scripts. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a JavaScript orchestration file (
repo-audit.js) to manage the audit workflow. It dynamically constructs prompts and tasks sub-agents to perform various analysis phases, which is an expected but high-complexity execution pattern.
Audit Metadata