dev-worktrees
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-supplied input (
$ARGUMENTSas the branch name) directly into multiple shell commands, includinggit worktree add,git branch, andmkdir -p. The instructions explicitly forbid sanitization ("do not sanitize or replace '/' with '-' or any other character"), which increases the risk of command injection if a branch name contains shell metacharacters (e.g.,feature; rm -rf /). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automatically searches for and executes a shell script (
dev-wt-ports.sh) found in common project directories liketools/dev/orscripts/. This execution occurs without explicit user confirmation of the script content, creating a risk of executing malicious code if an attacker can influence the project files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill invokes various package managers (
npm,yarn,pnpm,bun,cargo,pip,poetry) to download and install third-party dependencies based on manifests found in the project. While this is a standard developer workflow, it involves the execution of external code from public registries. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8):
- Ingestion points: The branch name is derived from
$ARGUMENTS, which may come from untrusted task descriptions or implementation plans. It also reads configuration from.claude/dev-setup.jsonandCLAUDE.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including shell execution (
git,bash), file system modification (mkdir,echoto.gitignore), and network operations (via package managers). - Sanitization: Absent. The skill explicitly instructs the agent not to sanitize the branch name input, and it follows paths from configuration files without further validation.
Audit Metadata