adb-magisk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data that could potentially influence agent behavior if the underlying scripts do not perform strict validation. * Ingestion points: The
device,module_path, andwait_textparameters in themagisk-setup.toonandinstall-module.toonworkflows inSKILL.md. * Boundary markers: The workflow instructions lack explicit delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from acting on instructions embedded within these parameters. * Capability inventory: The skill executes Python scripts (adb-magisk-launch.py,adb-magisk-enable-zygisk.py,adb-magisk-install-module.py) that perform file selection, UI interaction, and system configuration on the target Android device via ADB. * Sanitization: No input sanitization or validation logic is described in the skill documentation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation command fetches the skill definition from a public GitHub repository. * Evidence:
metadata.jsonincludes acurlcommand targetingraw.githubusercontent.com.
Audit Metadata