deepseek-code-mastery
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation encourages a 'Token-Efficient Pipeline' that uses
save_response.pyto write code generated by an external AI directly to the filesystem. This approach explicitly circumvents the standard human-in-the-loop or agent-based safety reviews (like the 'Write' tool), creating a direct path for executing potentially malicious code generated through manipulated AI responses. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The tool described in the skill automatically fetches a binary WASM file (
sha3_wasm_bg.wasm) from remote servers during the authentication process without explicit user verification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides extensive instructions for running local scripts and binaries (
run.py,DeepSeekCode.exe) that have the capability to perform broad filesystem and shell operations. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation specifies that session-sensitive data, including web
bearer_tokensandcookies, are stored in a plain textconfig.jsonfile, exposing them to any local process with read access. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary function involves sending local project data, including source code and configuration files, to external DeepSeek servers for processing.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted external inputs:
- Ingestion points: Inputs via
--delegatetasks,--agentgoals, and--requirementsdocuments (e.g.,features.md). - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt construction logic described.
- Capability inventory: Full filesystem read/write and shell execution capabilities via integrated tools.
- Sanitization: No input sanitization or validation of the requirements document is mentioned.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata