apify-influencer-discovery-v2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and summarizes untrusted data scraped from social media platforms (e.g., profile bios, comments, and post descriptions). Malicious instructions hidden in this data could potentially influence the agent's summarization or subsequent actions.
- Ingestion points: Social media profile data and metrics summarized in Step 5 of the workflow.
- Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the scraped content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities through
run_actor.jsand command execution viamcpcandnodescripts. - Sanitization: While the
run_actor.jsscript truncates long fields, it does not perform semantic sanitization or filtering of the ingested content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on shell commands to interact with the Apify platform and run local helper scripts, including logic to extract environment variables from local configuration files.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to
api.apify.comandmcp.apify.comto facilitate data extraction and actor management through the official endpoints of the Apify platform.
Audit Metadata