tool-use-guardian
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow begins by instructing the agent to execute
npx skills add christopherlhammer11-ai/tool-use-guardian. This command uses the Node.js package runner to download and execute code or configuration from a third-party, unverified source. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and attempts to install components from multiple unverified external repositories and domains, including
github.com/christopherlhammer11-ai/tool-use-guardianandgithub.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills. It also references non-whitelisted domains such asgenesis-node-api.vercel.appandgenesis-marketplace.vercel.appfor skill management. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to intercept, 'fix', and 'auto-coerce' tool outputs and malformed JSON. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) where an attacker-controlled tool output could bypass security boundaries during the 'fixing' process.
- Ingestion points: Processes truncated JSON, API timeouts, and error messages from external tools as described in the 'Failure Classification' section.
- Boundary markers: No explicit markers are defined to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the tool data it is attempting to fix.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses command execution capabilities (
npx) and manages multi-step tool chains. - Sanitization: The workflow describes 'auto-coercion' and 'auto-recovery' from malformed data without specifying any validation or sanitization protocols to ensure the integrity of the recovered content.
Audit Metadata