test-staging-branch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data by accessing a live Gmail inbox to retrieve OTP codes, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructs the agent to navigate to
mail.google.comand usechrome_evaluate_scriptorchrome_take_snapshotto read email content and previews (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions include security reminders to not log sensitive data, but there are no formal delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious prompts embedded within email bodies or subjects.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
chrome_navigate_page,chrome_fill,chrome_click, andchrome_evaluate_scriptfor browser automation, as well asgh pr commentfor writing to GitHub andvercelCLI for deployment management. - Sanitization: While the extraction of the OTP is limited by a JavaScript regex (
/\b\d{6}\b/), the agent is still exposed to the full text of the emails, which could contain adversarial instructions targeting the agent's broad tool permissions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using the Vercel and GitHub CLI tools.
- Evidence: The skill uses
vercel ls,vercel inspect, andgh pr commentto manage deployments and report results. - Context: These actions are consistent with the stated purpose of testing feature branches, but they represent a powerful capability that could be abused if the agent is influenced by malicious external input.
Audit Metadata