skills/diffusionstudio/skills/watch/Gen Agent Trust Hub

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Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation recommends executing commands with elevated privileges to modify system binaries.\n
  • Evidence: The file references/installation.md instructs the user or agent to run sudo ln -sf "/Applications/Diffusion Studio.app/Contents/Resources/cli/bin/dapi" /usr/local/bin/dapi.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on downloading software and source code from external repositories that are managed by the vendor.\n
  • Evidence: references/installation.md includes instructions for brew install --cask diffusionstudio/tap/editor and git clone https://github.com/diffusionstudio/editor.git.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes and interprets content from external media files, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.\n
  • Ingestion points: The dapi media listen and dapi media transcribe commands in SKILL.md ingest data from user-provided video and audio files.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat media-derived content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to the dapi CLI which can perform file system operations and media analysis.\n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the transcription or audio analysis output is performed before processing.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 10, 2026, 02:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — watch