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Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation recommends executing commands with elevated privileges to modify system binaries.\n
- Evidence: The file
references/installation.mdinstructs the user or agent to runsudo ln -sf "/Applications/Diffusion Studio.app/Contents/Resources/cli/bin/dapi" /usr/local/bin/dapi.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on downloading software and source code from external repositories that are managed by the vendor.\n - Evidence:
references/installation.mdincludes instructions forbrew install --cask diffusionstudio/tap/editorandgit clone https://github.com/diffusionstudio/editor.git.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes and interprets content from external media files, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.\n - Ingestion points: The
dapi media listenanddapi media transcribecommands inSKILL.mdingest data from user-provided video and audio files.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat media-derived content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
dapiCLI which can perform file system operations and media analysis.\n - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the transcription or audio analysis output is performed before processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata