commit-repo

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill relies on external configuration data from CLAUDE.md to resolve file system paths for git operations.
  • Ingestion points: The data path and repo-alias are parsed from the local CLAUDE.md file in the project root.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat the parsed paths as potentially untrusted or to validate them against a whitelist.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Bash tool to perform repository status checks, file staging (git add), and commits.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not verify that the resolved paths are within the intended project scope or check for shell metacharacters that could lead to command injection.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes Git commands via the Bash tool, using paths and messages derived from user input and project files.
  • Evidence: Sequential bash calls such as git -C <data-path> status and git -C <data-path> commit -m "<message>" are defined in the flow section.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions to bypass human confirmation gates when a specific flag is provided, increasing the risk of unintended file system modifications.
  • Evidence: The --yes flag is documented to "skip human confirmation gate — auto-approve the commit proposal," allowing the agent to commit changes without explicit user approval.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 30, 2026, 05:10 PM