commit-repo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill relies on external configuration data from
CLAUDE.mdto resolve file system paths for git operations. - Ingestion points: The
datapath andrepo-aliasare parsed from the localCLAUDE.mdfile in the project root. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat the parsed paths as potentially untrusted or to validate them against a whitelist.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform repository status checks, file staging (git add), and commits. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not verify that the resolved paths are within the intended project scope or check for shell metacharacters that could lead to command injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes Git commands via the
Bashtool, using paths and messages derived from user input and project files. - Evidence: Sequential bash calls such as
git -C <data-path> statusandgit -C <data-path> commit -m "<message>"are defined in the flow section. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions to bypass human confirmation gates when a specific flag is provided, increasing the risk of unintended file system modifications.
- Evidence: The
--yesflag is documented to "skip human confirmation gate — auto-approve the commit proposal," allowing the agent to commit changes without explicit user approval.
Audit Metadata