council
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) by interpolating untrusted data (user question) and semi-trusted local file content into prompts for sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: The user-supplied
<question>argument and the contents ofSKILL.mdandreference.mdfiles from other skills found via theGlobtool in the../../skills/*/directory. - Boundary markers: User input and file paths are wrapped in double quotes within the
Qualification PromptandCouncil Statement Prompttemplates inreference.md(e.g.,"{question}"). - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Agenttool to spawn sub-processes for philosopher personas and theWritetool to archive session results in the current working directory. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or validation of the user question or the content of the discovered skill files is performed before they are processed by the sub-agents.
Audit Metadata