encounter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts a user-provided topic and directly interpolates it into the initialization prompts for sub-agents (philosophers). This creates a surface where malicious input could attempt to override the sub-agents' behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
<topic>argument and theAskUserQuestiontool are used to collect external input inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The
Agenttool call prompt utilizes Markdown headers (e.g.,# Identity,# Encounter Context) and a warning block (⚠️ TEAM PROTOCOL — NON-NEGOTIABLE RULES ⚠️) to isolate context, which reduces but does not eliminate injection risks. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator skill is granted broad permissions, including
Bash,Write,Edit, and the ability to spawn sub-agents viaAgentandTeamCreatetools. - Sanitization: The skill instructions direct the agent to validate that the topic is "concrete" and "grounded," but there is no explicit mention of technical sanitization, escaping, or filtering for injection patterns.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's configuration (
allowed-tools) includes theBashtool. Although the skill logic focuses on orchestration and file writing rather than direct shell operations, the availability of this tool in a context that processes user-influenced prompts increases the potential impact of successful prompt injection.
Audit Metadata