meta-prompt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is built around reading and acting upon content from a file named
RELIANCE.mdacross multiple sessions. - Ingestion points: The
HAND/MAINzone inRELIANCE.mdis described as a human inbox where entries must be read and acted upon before any other logic. TheECOzone also involves reading and syncing external files listed as 'hot files'. - Boundary markers: The system uses Markdown headers (e.g.,
## MAIN) to separate zones, but instructions explicitly tell the agent that 'Human intent overrides machine drift' and to 'Act on each entry', creating a vulnerability if the file content contains malicious instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Edit,Write, andSkill(the ability to invoke other skills). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for the content read from the
RELIANCE.mdfile or the 'hot files' monitored for drift. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's
allowed-toolsincludeBash,Write, andEdit. While these are used for ledger maintenance and task management, their presence alongside the ingestion of external file content increases the impact of a successful indirect prompt injection attack.
Audit Metadata