openspec-sync

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the user-provided {change-id} argument directly in shell commands, which allows for command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters (e.g., ; rm -rf /).\n
  • Evidence: The sync, docs, and context commands in SKILL.md all instruct the agent to run openspec status {change-id} where {change-id} is derived from $ARGUMENTS.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it reads content from external files and uses that content to perform automated tasks or update other files.\n
  • Ingestion points: openspec/changes/{change-id}/tasks.md, openspec/changes/{change-id}/proposal.md, and openspec/project.md (referenced in SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No instructions are provided to the agent to ignore or delimit potentially malicious instructions within the processed files.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Bash, Write, Edit, Read, Glob, and Grep.\n
  • Sanitization: Absent. The workflow reads external file content and directly incorporates it into updates for CONTEXT-llm.md and documentation files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 2, 2026, 06:17 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — openspec-sync