openspec-sync
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the user-provided
{change-id}argument directly in shell commands, which allows for command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters (e.g.,; rm -rf /).\n - Evidence: The
sync,docs, andcontextcommands inSKILL.mdall instruct the agent to runopenspec status {change-id}where{change-id}is derived from$ARGUMENTS.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it reads content from external files and uses that content to perform automated tasks or update other files.\n - Ingestion points:
openspec/changes/{change-id}/tasks.md,openspec/changes/{change-id}/proposal.md, andopenspec/project.md(referenced inSKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: Absent. No instructions are provided to the agent to ignore or delimit potentially malicious instructions within the processed files.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write,Edit,Read,Glob, andGrep.\n - Sanitization: Absent. The workflow reads external file content and directly incorporates it into updates for
CONTEXT-llm.mdand documentation files.
Audit Metadata