pin
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a mechanism for persisting untrusted user data that is subsequently re-injected into the agent's active context via a companion hook.
- Ingestion points: User conversation history and direct text provided through the
/pincommand logic inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks specified delimiters, boundary markers, or 'ignore' instructions to isolate the pinned content from the agent's operational logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with
Bash,Read,Write, andEdittools; it specifically uses shell commands for dynamic path derivation in the 'State File' section. - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly command the agent to 'Store verbatim' with 'no cleanup' and 'no reformulation', ensuring that any malicious prompts embedded in user decisions are preserved and re-presented to the model.
Audit Metadata