persona-hr-coordinator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, creating a surface for instructions embedded in emails or documents to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads emails via
gws-gmailand processes files viagws-driveas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content provided in the workflow instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to send emails (
gws gmail +send), upload files (gws drive +upload), and perform administrative actions (gws admin). - Sanitization: While the instructions suggest using a
--sanitizeflag for PII, there is no technical enforcement or validation routine described for the ingested content itself. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill utilizes administrative tools that allow for sensitive account modifications.
- Evidence: The metadata and instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly enable and describe the use ofgws adminfor creating user accounts and resetting passwords.
Audit Metadata