dineway-building-restaurant
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions define shell command sequences for site validation. These include using
curlto verify local server routes (e.g., http://localhost:4321),rg(ripgrep) for linting anchor links in source files, andsqlite3for querying the local database to verify that content has been successfully seeded. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/restaurant_site_data.jsusesspawnSyncto execute thedinewayCLI throughnpxfor media uploads. Furthermore, the skill instructions guide the agent to usenpxfor generating types, seeding content, and deploying the site to the vendor's infrastructure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, including Google Place JSON, restaurant reviews, and official website content, and then re-write this information into public site content.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
places/${placeId}.jsonfiles and by crawling URLs extracted from thewebsiteUrifield. - Boundary markers: The instructions mandate the creation of a 'Customer Visibility Gate' and 'Brand Voice & Copy Tone Brief' (documented in
.plan/findings.md) intended to guide the agent in filtering out internal instructions or malicious prompts embedded in source data. - Capability inventory: The skill can perform file writes, execute shell commands for validation, and perform network requests to download images and crawl websites.
- Sanitization: The skill implements a 'visibility filter' as a procedural step where the agent must internally verify if content is appropriate for a guest before generating code or content files.
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