dingtalk-aisearch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and processes content from untrusted external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n- Ingestion points: Content is ingested from IM messages, emails, documents, calendar entries, and reports through the
dws aisearch enterpriseanddws aisearch behaviorcommands as defined inSKILL.mdandreferences/aisearch.md.\n- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or use specialized prompts to instruct the model to ignore potential instructions embedded within the retrieved search results or snippet previews.\n- Capability inventory: The agent can use data from initial search results to perform follow-up actions, such as fetching full documents vianodeIdor accessing detailed user contact information viauserId, as described in the multi-hop workflows inreferences/lite-recipes.md.\n- Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or escaping mechanisms are defined for handling the external content before it is processed by the AI model.
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