dingtalk-chat
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from DingTalk messages and threads, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. \n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the agent context via message reading and searching commands such as
dws chat +chat-messages,+search-msg, and+thread-replieslocated inreferences/chat/message-query.mdandreferences/chat/thread.md. \n - Boundary markers: The
SKILL.mdfile defines a 'Runtime Contract' that mandates structured data reading using--format jsonand explicit verification of results to prevent misinterpretation of malformed or malicious data. \n - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities across all its scripts, including sending messages, creating and managing groups, and writing to the local file system using the
--outputand--download-resourcesflags (as seen inreferences/01-messaging.mdandreferences/chat/message-media.md). \n - Sanitization: The instructions do not define specific sanitization or escaping protocols for the processed text, relying on the agent's internal safety guardrails and the structured nature of the CLI output.
Audit Metadata