dingtalk-shared
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to ingest and process data from external DingTalk sharing links (alidocs.dingtalk.com/i/p/...) using the
read_urltool inreferences/url-patterns.md. This represents a surface where malicious instructions embedded in a document's content or metadata could influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points:
references/url-patterns.md(via theread_urltool for sharing links) andreferences/recipes/conventions.md(via search/list command results). - Boundary markers: The skill implements extensive node type probing using
dws drive infoto validate content before processing, as described inreferences/url-patterns.md. - Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to read/write files, manage calendars, send chat messages, and export authentication packages using the
dwsCLI binary. - Sanitization: The skill includes detailed instructions to normalize URLs and resolve 'dlink' (shortcut) targets to their stable original IDs before performing content-level operations to prevent redirection or identity confusion.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes shell commands via the
dwsbinary to perform business logic. It provides specific instructions for constructing parallel shell execution strings (e.g., using the&operator andwait) to handle multiple resource IDs efficiently inreferences/recipes/conventions.md. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill defines strict handling rules for sensitive credentials. It explicitly forbids the agent from outputting or recording tokens, app secrets, or webhook tokens in
SKILL.mdandreferences/runtime-contract.md. Additionally, it provides guidance for thedws auth exportcommand inreferences/global-reference.md, cautioning that authentication packages contain sensitive material and must not have their contents printed.
Audit Metadata