dingtalk-tag
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external data sources, specifically IM messages (
im_message) and conversation traces (trace), which can contain untrusted content intended to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: External data enters the context via the
dws dingtalk-tag runcommands and theconnectevent consumer (documented inrun.mdandmanage-and-connect.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions mention using
--body-stdinand--employee-contextto handle "restricted body text" and binding contexts, suggesting some separation (documented inSKILL.md). - Capability inventory: The skill has extensive file system access (uploads), network communication via the
dwstool, and arbitrary command execution via--agent-cmd. - Sanitization: While the CLI is noted to perform internal validation (
check_mcp), the instructions do not detail specific sanitization or escaping of the ingested message content before it is processed by the model. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes heavy use of the
dwsCLI binary to perform administrative tasks, including creating, modifying, and deleting digital employees. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
connectcommand supports a--agent-cmdflag for a "custom" channel, which executes a user-provided command and uses its standard output as the model's response. This represents a powerful dynamic execution surface (documented inmanage-and-connect.md). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes functionality to read local files (images for avatars, JSON for MCP configurations, and ZIP files for Skill resources) and upload them to a remote server via OpenAPI multipart requests (documented in
capability.mdandmanage.md). While this is a core feature, it involves sending local data to an external endpoint.
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